Doxastic Permissiveness and the Promise of Truth
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Synthese 194 (12): 4897-4912.
The purpose of this paper is to challenge what is often called the "Uniqueness" thesis. According to this thesis, given one's total evidence, there is a unique rational doxastic attitude that one can take to any proposition. It is sensible for defenders of Uniqueness to commit to the principle that: when some agent A's evidence gives A equal reason both to believe that p and to believe that not p, the uniquely rational doxastic attitude for A to adopt with respect to p is the suspension of judgment. In this paper, I offer a case wherein the agent has equal reason both to believe that p and to believe that not p, but the agent is not rationally required to suspend judgment about whether p. Furthermore, the case is such that there seems to be no uniquely rational attitude for the agent to adopt. If this is correct, the case seems to be a counterexample to Uniqueness. I proceed to explain why I think it will be difficult to defend Uniqueness from the example. Defenders of Uniqueness often motivate the thesis – sometimes in equal reasons cases in particular – by appealing to the valuable connection between epistemic rationality and the truth. But I demonstrate that, ironically, to the extent that one takes this connection seriously, it will be to that extent more difficult to defend Uniqueness from this apparent counterexample. |
Motivating Reason to Slow the Factive Turn in Epistemology
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The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Mitova, Veli (ed.). Cambridge University Press: 177-192.
As factive views of reasons are gaining favor in epistemology, theories of practical reason have been increasingly considering the possibility of nonfactive views. This paper is part of a larger project that encourages more exchange between theorists of practical and epistemic reasons. Such an exchange could be especially fruitful, I think, with respect to the issue of factivity. My primary purpose in this paper is to slow the factive turn in epistemology, as it were, by appealing points about the nature of practical reasons. I argue that the best theory of reasons will hold just one position about the factivity of reasons, which holds for all "kinds" of reasons – whether practical, epistemic, or moral. I then proceed to argue that if motivating reasons need not be facts, then normative reasons need not be facts. What follows is a connection that I suspect many will find surprising: these two claims together show that in order for one to successfully establish the view that normative epistemic reasons are facts, one must discredit the view that motivating practical reasons are facts. I treat three serious objections, including an influential argument that motivating reasons must be facts. If there are no better objections than the three that I see off, I conclude, we have found a novel argument against the view that normative epistemic reasons must be facts. |
Facts, Reasons, and Explanations
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Abstract: Central to current theories of reasons is the question of whether, in order for an agent A to act for some reason r, it must be the case that r. The Factive View answer in the affirmative, while Nonfactive View answers in the negative. According to a common argument, which has won the Factive View much of the support it currently enjoys, the Nonfactive View is incompatible with giving satisfying reasons-explanations of actions in a certain class of cases. This argument relies on two axioms in action theory. One axiom is that motivating reasons can play an explanatory role with respect to the actions they are done for. The second axiom is that explanation is factive. Together, these axioms are supposed to show that one cannot act for a reason that is not the case. I show that this chief argument against the Nonfactive View fails, and demonstrate that the Nonfactive View is consistent with these two axioms. Furthermore, to cut to the core of this common argument, I illustrate the ample explanatory resources that the Nonfactive View has at its disposal. I conclude that, contrary to a widespread thought in the theory of reasons, the Nonfactive View seems just as well off as its competitor with respect to action explanation.
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Breaking the Rules of Explanation
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Abstract: It is a common thought that theorizing about a certain class of cases, often called "error cases," is crucial to settling central debates about acting for reasons. These are cases in which, roughly, the agent errs in some way in arriving at a view about how the world is, and then proceeds to act in the light of that view. Theorists divide on how they respond to error cases. But despite their many differences, they all claim to glean motivation for their views from such cases; and they all do so in the same way. They all claim that while their theory has no trouble giving good reasons-explanations of actions in error cases, other theories are explanatorily deficient. My primary purpose in this paper is to show that this kind of argument is flawed. I argue that there is quite a large gap between what can be said about error cases and the general claims about acting for reasons that theorists claim these cases establish; and this gap is one that can only be bridged by placing unmotivated and implausible constraints on action explanation. If I am right about this, two important conclusions are secured. One is quite straightforward: arguments from error are either invalid or unsound. But the second conclusion is that, contrary to common thought, we should perhaps turn our attention away from error cases when theorizing about acting for reasons.
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Are Reasons Beliefs?
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Abstract: In recent theorizing about responding to reasons, a new question has arisen. This is the question of what I call the cognitive constraint: what cognitive relation must some agent A stand in to some reason r in order to act (whether practically or epistemically) for the reason that r? While some have advocated for the view that the correct cognitive constraint is knowledge, there is widespread agreement that the correct constraint cannot be any weaker than belief. I argue, though, that the truth of this Belief View has a significant implication for the ontology of reasons. A currently popular theory in the ontology of reasons is what has been called Psychologism, the view that motivating reasons are psychological states (or facts about those states) of agents. I present a fatal dilemma for Psychologist in attempting to accommodate the Belief View. One option is for Psychologism to try to incorporate the Belief View straightforwardly. But I demonstrate that this option leads to the implausible proliferation of second-order psychological states (such as A's believing that A believes that r). The second option is for the Psychologist to suggest that Psychologism is itself a variation of the Belief View: Psychologism captures the desired cognitive constraint by identifying the agent's reason with the agent's belief. But I argue that this option leaves Psychologism without an undeniable distinction: that between acting for the reason that r and acting for the reason that A believes that r. In the face of this dilemma, I claim, either Psychologism or the Belief View must be rejected. I conclude by suggesting that the more plausible overall theory of reasons will be one that keeps the Belief View and gives up Psychologism.
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